Method, system and apparatus for improved reliability in generating secret cryptographic variables

ABSTRACT

A method, system and apparatus are described which utilize a trusted third party, or Certification Authority (CA) in the generation of a reliable seed to be used in the generation of prime numbers used in public key cryptography. The inclusion of the trusted third party allows for an independent third party to police against first party attacks on the security of the system without increasing the overhead of the system significantly.

BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION

Cryptography is a security mechanism for protecting information from unintended disclosure by transforming the information into a form that is unreadable to humans, and unreadable to machines that are not specially adapted to reversing the transformation back to the original information content. The cryptographic transformation can be performed on data that is to be transmitted electronically, such as an electronic mail message, and is equally useful for data that is to be securely stored, such as the account records for customers of a bank or credit company.

In addition to preventing unintended disclosure, cryptography also provides a mechanism for preventing unauthorized alteration of data transmitted or stored in electronic form. After the data has been transformed cryptographically, an unauthorized person is unlikely to be able to determine how to alter the data, because the specific data portion of interest cannot be recognized. Even if the unauthorized user knew the position of the data portion within a data file or message, this position may have been changed by the transformation, preventing the unauthorized person from merely substituting data in place. If an alteration to the transformed data is made by the unauthorized user despite the foregoing difficulties, the fact of the alteration will be readily detectable, so that the data will be considered untrustworthy and not relied upon. This detection occurs when the transformation is reversed; the encrypted data will not reverse to its original contents properly if it has been altered. The same principle prevents unauthorized addition of characters to the data, and deletion of characters from the data, once it has been transformed.

The transformation process performed on the original data is referred to as “encryption.” The process of reversing the transformation, to restore the original data, is referred to as “decryption.” The terms “encipher” and “decipher” are also used to describe these processes, respectively. A mechanism that can both encipher and decipher is referred to as a “cipher.” Data encryption systems are well known in the data processing art. In general, such systems operate by performing an encryption on a plaintext input block, using an encryption key, to produce a ciphertext output block. “Plaintext” refers to the fact that the data is in plain, unencrypted form. “Ciphertext” refers to the fact that the data is in enciphered or encrypted form. The receiver of an encrypted message performs a corresponding decryption operation, using a decryption key, to recover the original plaintext block.

A cipher to be used in a computer system can be implemented in hardware, in software, or in a combination of hardware and software. Hardware chips are available that implement various ciphers. Software algorithms are known in the art as well.

Encryption systems fall into two general categories. Symmetric (or secret key) encryption systems use the same secret key for both encrypting and decrypting messages. An example of a symmetric encryption system is the Data Encryption Standard (DES) system, which is a United States federal standard described in a National Institute of Standards and Technology Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS Pub 46). In the DES system, a key having 56 independently specified bits is used to convert 64-bit plaintext blocks to 64-bit ciphertext blocks, or vice versa.

Asymmetric (or public key) encryption systems, on the other hand, use two different keys that are not feasibly derivable from one another, one for encryption and another for decryption. A person wishing to receive messages generates a pair of corresponding encryption and decryption keys. The encryption key is made public, while the corresponding decryption key is kept secret. Anyone wishing to communicate with the receiver may encrypt a message using the receiver's public key. Only the receiver may decrypt the message, since only he has the private key. One of the best-known known asymmetric encryption systems is the RSA encryption system, named for its originators Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman, and described in U.S. Pat. No. 4,405,829 to Rivest et al., “Cryptographic Communications System and Method.”

A public key system is frequently used to encrypt and transmit secret keys for use with a secret key system. A public key system is also used to provide for digital signatures, in which the sender encrypts a signature message using his private key. Because the signature message can only be decrypted with the sender's public key, the recipient can use the sender's public key to confirm that the signature message originated with the sender.

A commonplace method, for both signature generation and signature verification, is to reduce the message M (to be signed) by means of a cryptographic hash function, in which case, the hash of the message, H(M), is signed instead of the message M itself. Signing H(M) requires only one encryption operation whereas signing M may require several encryption operations, depending on the length of M.

One of the serious concerns regarding most public key cryptography systems is that, since some public keys can be weaker (although very few, some are easier to “break” than others), an ill intentioned party may deliberately generate such a weaker key to be used to encrypt certain valuable information or to electronically sign a document. This party, if it finds it useful for its purposes, may claim that since the “weak” key was used for a particular transaction, an attacker could decrypt the message or forge a signature. This cheating user can then require the annulment of the transaction or other actions based on such a weakness in the key. For example, if a key used in the Elliptic Curve cryptography system is such that the private key, usually denoted as d, is short, then the encryption can be solved much faster than in the general case. A danger is becoming even more apparent when one is dealing with cryptography systems based on a popular and widely accepted RSA algorithm.

Such a danger exists only when the cheating party (often referred to as “the first party” in the situations described above since the party is responsible for the generation of the key which constitutes the first step in the encryption or in a signing protocol) puts a significant effort into generating such “bad” keys since the probability of obtaining one at random is extremely small. The purpose of this invention is to develop a protocol which will ultimately stop these efforts of a first party attacker and thus assure all parties in the quality of the public keys and in the non-repudiation of the signatures generated.

The approach herein is described with respect to the RSA signature algorithm although it is equally applicable to use in other public key cryptography systems requiring the generation of primes.

A method for computing digital signatures with the RSA algorithm is described in ANSI Standard X9.31-1998 Digital Signatures Using Reversible Public Key Cryptography For The Financial Services Industry (rDSA). ANSI Standard X9.31 defines procedures for:

i. Choosing the public verification exponent, e,

ii. Generating the private prime factors, p and q, and public modulus, n=pq, and

iii. Calculating the private signature exponent, d.

The procedure for signing a message M (signature production) consists of the following steps: M is hashed using a cryptographic hash function H to produce a hash value H(M). H(M) is then encapsulated within a data structure IR, a representative element RR is computed from IR, and RR is raised to the power d modulo n. The signature Σ is either the result or its complement to n, whichever is smaller. That is, Σ=min{RR^(d) mod n, n−(RR^(d) mod n)}. The signature Σ is exactly one bit less in length than the length of the modulus n. The message and signature (M, Σ) are then sent to the receiver for verification.

The procedure for verifying a signature (signature verification) consists of the following steps: The verifier treats the message and signature as (M′, Σ′) until the signature verification is successful, and it is proven that M=M′ and Σ=Σ′. The signature Σ′ is raised to the power e mod n in order to obtain the intermediate integer RR′. That is, RR′=(Σ′)^(e) mod n. The intermediate integer IR′ is then computed from RR′ as a function of the least significant (right most) bits of RR′. A sanity check is then performed on IR′, and if this step succeeds, the value of H(M)′ is then recovered from IR′. Finally, a hash is computed on the received message M′, and the computed value of H(M′) is compared for equality with the recovered value of H(M)′. The verification process succeeds if the two values are equal and it fails if the two values are not equal.

The public exponent is a positive integer e, where 2≦e≦2^(k−160), and k is the length of the modulus n in bits. The public exponent may be selected as a fixed value or generated as a random value. When e is odd, the digital signature algorithm is called RSA. When e is even, the digital signature algorithm is called Rabin-Williams. Common fixed values for e are 2, 3, 17, and 2¹⁶+1=65,537.

The public modulus, n, is the product of two distinct positive primes, p and q (i.e., n=pq).

The private prime factors, p and q, are secretly and randomly selected by each signing entity. The private prime factors must satisfy several conditions, as follows:

1. Constraints on p and q relative to e are:

If e is odd, then e shall be relatively prime to both p−1 and q−1.

If e is even, then p shall be congruent to 3 mod 8, q shall be congruent to 7 mod 8, and e shall be relatively prime to both (p−1)/2 and (q−1)/2.

2. The numbers p±1 and q±1 shall have large prime factors greater than 2¹⁰⁰ and less then 2¹²⁰, such that:

p−1 has a large prime factor denoted by p¹

p+1 has a large prime factor denoted by p²

q−1 has a large prime factor denoted by q¹

q+1 has a large prime factor denoted by q²

3. The private prime factor p is the first discovered prime greater than a random number X_(p), where (2)(2^(511+128s))≦X_(p)≦(2^(512+128s)−1), and meets the criteria in Nos. 1 and 2 above, and the private prime factor q is the first discovered prime greater than a random number X_(q), where (2)(2^(511+128s))≦X_(q)≦(2^(512+128s)−1), and meets the criteria in Nos. 1 and 2 above. s=0, 1, 2, etc. is an integer used to fix the block size. Once selected, the value of s remains constant for the duration of the prime generation procedure.

4. The random numbers Xp and Xq must be different by at least one of their first most significant 100 bits, i.e., |X_(p)−X_(q)|>2^(412+128s). For example, if s=4, so that X_(p) and X_(q) are 1024-bit random numbers, then the most significant bit of X_(p) and the most significant bit of X_(q) must be “1” and the next most significant 99 bits of X_(p) and the next most significant 99 bits of X_(q) must be different in at least 1 bit. Likewise, the private prime factors, p and q, must also satisfy the relationship |p−q|>2^(412+128s).

The private signature exponent, d, is a positive integer such that d>2^(512+128s). That is, the length of d must be at least half the length of the modulus n. d is calculated as follows:

If e is odd, then d=e⁻¹ mod (LCM (p−1, q−1))

If e is even, then d=e⁻¹ mod (½ LCM (p−1, q−1))

where LCM denotes “Least Common Multiple.” In the rare event that d≦2^(512+128s), then the key generation process is repeated with new seeds for X_(q1), X_(q2), and X_(q). The random numbers X_(q1) and X_(q2) are defined below.

The candidates for the private prime factors, p and q, are constructed using the large prime factors, p₁, p₂, q₁, and q₂, and the Chinese Remainder Theorem (see A. Menezes, P. C. Van Oorschot, and S. Vanstone, Handbook of Applied Cryptography, CRC Press, 1997.)

The large prime factors p₁, p₂, q₁, and q₂, are generated from four generated random numbers X_(p1), X_(p2), X_(q1) and X_(q2). The random numbers are chosen from an interval [2^(100+a), 2^(101+a)−1] where “a” satisfies 0≦a≦20. For example, if a=19, then the random numbers are randomly selected from the interval [2¹¹⁹, 2¹²⁰−1], in which case the random numbers each have 120 bits, where the most significant bit of each generated number X_(p1), X_(p2), X_(q1) and X_(q2) is “1.” If a pseudo random number generator (PRNG) is used, it is recommended that the four random numbers should be generated from 4 separate input seeds.

The p₁, p₂, q₁, and q₂, are the first primes greater than their respective random X values (X_(p1), X_(p2), X_(q1) and X_(q2)) and such that they are mutually prime with the public exponent e. That is, e must not contain a factor equal to p₁, p₂, q₁, or q₂.

The procedure to generate the private prime factor p is as follows:

A. Select a value of s, e.g., s=4.

B. Generate a random number X_(p) such that (2)(2^(511+128s))≦X_(p)≦(2^(512+128s)−1).

C. Compute the intermediate values:

R _(p)=(p ₂ ⁻¹ mod p ₁)p ₂−(p ₁ ⁻¹ mod p ₂)p ₁

 If R_(p)<0, then replace R_(p) by R_(p)+p₁p₂.

Y ₀ =X _(p)+(R _(p) −X _(p) mod p ₁ p ₂).

If e is odd, do the following:

1. If Y₀<X_(p), replace Y₀ by (Y₀+p₁p₂). Y₀ is the least positive integer greater than X_(p) congruent to (1 mod p₁) and (−1 mod p₂). This ensures that p₁ is a large prime factor of (Y₀−1) and p₂ is a large prime factor of (Y₀+1).

2. Search the integer sequence

{Y ₀ , Y ₁ =Y ₀+(p ₁ p ₂), Y ₂ =Y ₀+2(p ₁ p ₂), Y ₃ =Y ₀+3(p ₁ p ₂), . . . , Y _(i) =Y ₀ +I(p ₁ p ₂)}

 in order, where I is an integer ≧0, until finding a Y_(i) such that

Y_(i) is prime and

GCD (Y_(i)−1, e)=1

 where GCD is Greatest Common Divisor, in which case, p=Y_(i).

If e is even, do the following:

1. Replace Y₀ with Y₀+kp₁p₂, where 0≦k≦7 is the smallest non-negative integer that makes Y₀+kp₁p₂=3 mod 8. If Y₀<X_(p), replace Y₀ by (Y₀+8p₁p₂). Y₀ is the least positive integer greater than X_(p) congruent to (1 mod p₁) and (−1 mod p₂) and (3 mod 8).

2. Search the integer sequence.

{Y ₀ , Y ₁ =Y ₀+(8p ₁ p ₂), Y ₂ =Y ₀+2(8p ₁ p ₂), Y ₃ =Y ₀+3(8p ₁ p ₂), . . . , Y _(i) =Y ₀ +I(8p ₁ p ₂)}

 in order, where I is an integer≧0, until finding a Y_(i) such that

Y_(i) is prime and

GCD ((Y_(i)−1)/2, e)=1, and Y_(i)=3 mod 8

 in which case, p=Y_(i).

The procedure to generate the private prime factor q is as follows:

A. The s used to generate q is the same s used to generate p, e.g., s=4.

B. Generate a random number X_(q) such that (2)(2^(511+128s))≦X_(q)≦(2^(512+128s)−1).

C. Compute the intermediate values:

R _(q)=(q ₂ ⁻¹ mod q ₁)q ₂−(q ₁ ⁻¹ mod q ₂)q ₁.

 If R_(q)<0, then replace R_(q) by R_(q)+q₁q₂.

Y ₀ =X _(q)+(R _(q) −X _(q) mod q ₁ q ₂).

If e is odd, do the following:

1. If Y₀<X_(q), replace Y₀ by (Y₀+q₁q₂). Y₀ is the least positive integer greater than X_(q) congruent to (1 mod q₁) and (−1 mod q₂). This ensures that q₁ is a large prime factor of (Y₀−1) and q₂ is a large prime factor of (Y₀+1).

2. Search the integer sequence

{Y ₀ , Y ₁ =Y ₀+(q ₁ q ₂), Y ₂ =Y ₀+2(q ₁ q ₂), Y ₃ =Y ₀+3(q ₁ q ₂), . . . , Y _(i) =Y ₀ +I(q ₁ q ₂)}

 in order, where I is an integer≧0, until finding a Y_(i) such that

Y_(i) is prime and

GCD (Y_(i)−1, e)=1

 in which case, q=Y_(i).

If e is even, do the following:

1. Replace Y₀ with Y₀+kq₁q₂, where 0≦k≦7 is the smallest non-negative integer that makes Y₀+kq₁q₂=7 mod 8. If Y₀<X_(p), replace Y₀ by (Y₀+8q₁q₂). Y₀ is the least positive integer greater than X_(q) congruent to (1 mod q₁) and (−1 mod q₂) and (7 mod 8).

2. Search the integer sequence.

{Y ₀ , Y ₁ =Y ₀+(8q ₁ q ₂), Y ₂ =Y ₀+2(8q ₁ q ₂), Y ₃ =Y ₀+3(8q ₁ q ₂), . . . , Y _(i) =Y ₀ +I(8q ₁ q ₂)}

 in order, where I is an integer≧0, until finding a Y_(i) such that

Y_(i) is prime and

GCD ((Y_(i)−1)/2, e)=1, and Y_(i)=7 mod 8

 in which case, q=Y_(i).

As mentioned above, the value |X_(p)−X_(q)| must be >2^(412+128s). If not, then another X_(q) is generated, and a new value of q is computed. This step is repeated until the constraint is satisfied. Likewise, the generated values of p and q must satisfy the relation |p−q|>2^(412+128s).

NOTE: It is very unlikely that the test on |X_(p)−X_(q)| would succeed and the test on |p−q| would fail.

NOTE: According to the X9.31 Standard, if a pseudo random number generator is used to generate random numbers, then separate seeds should be used to generate X_(p) and X_(q).

Altogether there are six random numbers X_(i) needed in the generation of the private prime factors, p and q, namely X_(p), X_(p1), X_(p2), X_(q), X_(q1) and X_(q2). These random numbers are generated by either a true noise hardware randomizer (RNG) or via a pseudo random generator (PRNG).

The random numbers X_(i) are generated differently depending on whether or not the process of generating the private prime factors (p and q) requires the capability to be audited later by an independent third party.

In the case where no audit is required, the outputs of the RNG and the PRNG are used directly as the random numbers X_(i). In the case where audit is required, the outputs of the RNG and the PRNG are used as intermediate values, called SEED (upper case) values, and these SEED values are then hashed to produce the random numbers X_(i). That is, when an audit capability is required, an extra hashing step is used in the generation of the random numbers X_(i).

The PRNG itself makes use of an input seed (lower case), which is different from the generated SEED values. Thus, when an audit capability is required and a PRNG is used, a random seed (lower case) is input to the PRNG and a SEED (upper case) is output from the PRNG.

To illustrate the process, suppose that one wishes to generate a 1024 bit random number X_(i) using SHA-1 as the hash algorithm—see ANSI Standard X9.30-1996, Public Key Cryptography Using Irreversible Algorithms for the Financial Services Industry, Part 2: The Secure Hash Algorithm-1 (SHA-1). Since the output hash value from SHA-1 is 160 bits, the optimal method for generating an X_(i) of 1024 bits is to generate 7 160-bit SEED values, denoted SEED1 through SEED7, hash each of these SEED values with SHA-1 to produce 7 corresponding 160-bit hash values, denoted hash1 through hash7, and then extract 1024 bits from the available 1120 bits, e.g., by concatenating the values hash1 through hash6 together with 64 bits taken from hash7. The method for generating a 120-bit X_(i) is more straightforward. In this case, a single 160-bit SEED is generated and then hashed, and 120 bits are taken from the resulting hash value. The concatenation of the 7 SEED values used in generating each of X_(p) and X_(q) are denoted X_(p)SEED and X_(q)SEED, respectively. The single SEED values used in generating X_(p1), X_(p2), X_(q1) and X_(q2) are denoted X_(p1)SEED, X_(p2)SEED, X_(q1)SEED, and X_(q2)SEED, respectively.

In order to allow for audit, the SEED values X_(p)SEED, X_(q)SEED, X_(p1)SEED, X_(p2)SEED, X_(q1)SEED, and X_(q2)SEED must be saved, and they must be available in case an audit is required. The SEED values must also be kept secret. It is recommended that the SEED values (X_(p)SEED, X_(q)SEED, X_(p1)SEED, X_(p2)SEED, X_(q1)SEED, and X_(q2)SEED) be retained with the private key as evidence that the primes were generated in an arbitrary manner.

The procedure for auditing the generation procedure (i.e., the generation of the private prime factors, p and q) is a follows:

1. The inputs to the audit procedure are the public exponent e, the public modulus n, and the six secret SEED values X_(p)SEED, X_(q)SEED, X_(p1)SEED, X_(p2)SEED, X_(q1)SEED, and X_(q2)SEED.

2. The SEED values X_(p)SEED, X_(q)SEED, X_(p1)SEED, X_(p2)SEED, X_(q1)SEED, and X_(q2)SEED are hashed, and the random numbers X_(p), X_(q), X_(p1), X_(p2), X_(q1) and X_(q2), are produced from the generated hash values, respectively, using the same procedure that was used to generate the private prime factors, p and q.

3. The private prime factors, p and q, and the private signature exponent d are regenerated using the same procedure used originally to generate p, q, and d.

4. The generated p and q are multiplied together and the resulting product is compared for equality with the input modulus n. If the two values are equal, then the prime factors were generated according to the rules prescribed in the ANSI X9.31 Standard. Otherwise, the prime factors were not generated according to the rules prescribed in the ANSI X9.31 Standard.

The audit procedure is specifically designed to defend against a so-called First Party Attack. In a first party attack, a user purposely generates a large number of candidate prime numbers until one is found that has some mathematical weakness. Later, the user repudiates one or more of his generated signatures by showing that a weakness exists in one of his primes and claiming that the weakness was discovered and exploited by an adversary. In such a case, the user (or First Party) does not follow the prescribed ANSI X9.31 private prime factor generation procedure, but instead uses a different method to purposely construct primes that have a desired weakness. Even if one generates a pair of strong primes as required by the ANSI X9.31 standard, it is still possible that the primes are “bad”, that is, that the primes have such undesirable properties as p/q is near the ratio of two small integers or |p−q| does not have a large prime factor or that GCD(p−1, q−1) is small. While these situations are highly unlikely to occur, it is possible that a persistent attacker may find such primes and use them to deliberately generate a “bad” public key.

But, the ANSI X9.31 method of prime number generation—hashing SEED values to generate the needed random numbers, X_(i)—prevents an insider from starting with an intentionally constructed “bad prime” and working backwards to derive the SEED(s) needed to generate the prime. Whereas, it might be possible to start with a constructed “bad prime” and invert the steps to obtain the corresponding random number X_(i) (needed to produce the “bad prime”), it is not possible to invert the hash function to determine the required input SEED(s) that will produce X_(i). In effect, the method of using hash values forces the user to generate his primes using a “forward process.” This means that the only way a “bad prime” can be produced is by pure chance—by repeatedly selecting different starting SEED values and generating primes from these SEED values until a “bad prime” happens to be produced. However, the probability of such a chance event is very small, in fact small enough so that (for practical purposes) a user will never be able to find a “bad prime” using trial and error.

The procedure for generating the private prime factors (p and q) and the private signature exponent d can be specified in terms of the following abbreviated steps:

1. Generate X_(p1)SEED, and then generate X_(p1) from X_(p1)SEED. This is a constructive step that cannot fail.

2. Generate p₁ from X_(p1). This step is an iterative step in which candidate values of p_(i) are generated from a single starting value X_(p1), in a prescribed order, until a p₁ is found that satisfies a required primality test and a test involving the public verification exponent e. The step can potentially fail in the very unlikely event that the size of the generated p₁ (e.g., 121 bits) is greater than the size of the starting value X_(p1) (e.g., 120 bits). If step 2 fails, then repeat steps 1 and 2; otherwise, continue with step 3.

3. Generate X_(p2)SEED, and then generate X_(p2) from X_(p2)SEED. This is a constructive step that cannot fail.

4. Generate p₂ from X_(p2). This step is an iterative step in which candidate values of p₂ are generated from a single starting value X_(p2), in a prescribed order, until a p₂ is found that satisfies a required primality test and a test involving the public verification exponent e. The step can potentially fail in the very unlikely event that the size of the generated p₂ (e.g., 121 bits) is greater than the size of the starting value X_(p2) (e.g., 120 bits). If step 4 fails, then repeat steps 3 and 4; otherwise, continue with step 5.

5. Generate X_(p)SEED (e.g., consisting of 7 160-bit SEEDS), and then generate X_(p) from X_(p)SEED. This step involves a test to ensure that X_(p) falls within a specified range of allowed values. The step is repeated (possibly several times) until a suitable value of X_(p) is found.

6. Generate p from X_(p). This step is an iterative step in which candidate values of p are generated from a single starting value X_(p), in a prescribed order, until a p is found that satisfies a required primality test and a test involving the public verification exponent e. The step can potentially fail in the extremely unlikely event that the size of the generated p (e.g., 1025 bits) is greater than the size of the starting value X_(p) (e.g., 1024 bits). If step 6 fails, then repeat steps 5 and 6; otherwise, continue with step 7

7. Generate X_(q1)SEED, and then generate X_(q1) from X_(q1)SEED. This is a constructive step that cannot fail.

8. Generate q₁ from X_(q1). This step is an iterative step in which candidate values of q₁ are generated from a single starting value X_(q1), in a prescribed order, until a q₁ is found that satisfies a required primality test and a test involving the public verification exponent e. The step can potentially fail in the very unlikely event that the size of the generated q₁ (e.g., 121 bits) is greater than the size of the starting value X_(q1) (e.g., 120 bits). If step 8 fails, then repeat steps 7 and 8; otherwise, continue with step 9.

9. Generate X_(q2)SEED, and then generate X_(q2) from X_(q2)SEED. This is a constructive step that cannot fail.

10. Generate q₂ from X_(q2). This step is an iterative step in which candidate values of q₂ are generated from a single starting value X_(q2), in a prescribed order, until a q₂ is found that satisfies a required primality test and a test involving the public verification exponent e. The step can potentially fail in the very unlikely event that the size of the generated q₂ (e.g., 121 bits) is greater than the size of the starting value X_(q2) (e.g., 120 bits). If step 10 fails, then repeat steps 9 and 10; otherwise, continue with step 11.

11. Generate X_(q)SEED (e.g., consisting of 7 160-bit SEEDs), and then generate X_(q) from X_(q)SEED. This step involves a test to ensure that X_(q) falls within a specified range of allowed values and that |X_(p)−X_(q)| is greater than a specified value. The step is repeated (possibly several times) until a suitable value of X_(q) is found.

12. Generate q from X_(q). This step is an iterative step in which candidate values of q are generated from a single starting value X_(q), in a prescribed order, until a q is found that satisfies a required primality test and a test involving the public verification exponent e and a test to ensure that |p−q| is greater than a specified value. The step can potentially fail in the extremely unlikely event that the size of the generated q (e.g., 1025 bits) is greater than the size of the starting value X_(q) (e.g., 1024 bits). If step 12 fails, then repeat steps 11 and 12; and otherwise, continue with step 13.

13. Generate the private signature exponent d from e, p and q. Then test d to ensure that it is smaller than a specified value. In the extremely rare event that the test on d fails, repeat steps 7 through 13; otherwise stop.

The ANSI X9.31 prescribed audit procedure has certain disadvantages.

1. For a modulus with 1024-bit primes, approximately 2880 bits of extra SEED values (X_(p)SEED, X_(q)SEED, X_(p1)SEED, X_(p2)SEED, X_(q1)SEED, and X_(q2)SEED) would need to be carried with each private key. This more than triples the number of secret bits that need to be carried in the “private key.”

2. Although the ANSI X9.31 Standard recommends that the SEED values be retained with the private key, some implementers may object to this (e.g., when the key is stored on a smart card or when the key is input to a cryptographic function or cryptographic hardware to perform a cryptographic operation), and they may elect to retain the SEED values separately from the private key. But keeping the SEED values separate from the private key has even worse ramifications. In that case, the SEED values may become lost or damaged, in which case the audit function is crippled or rendered ineffective, and most likely the signature key is also rendered ineffective. The user must also protect the secrecy of the of the SEED values, since if the SEED values are discovered by an adversary, they can be easily used to generate the primes and private key, and hence to forge signatures. Storing the private key and SEED values in two different locations means that there are now two targets or points of attack for the adversary, not just one. Thus, when the audit feature is used, the honest user must take extra special steps to prevent the SEEDs from becoming lost or damaged and to protect the secrecy of the SEEDs. This places an extra burden on the user.

3. The SEED values are independent, and there is no apparent need for this. Consequently it might be possible for an insider attacker to exploit this degree of independence to attack the procedure.

As noted above, though, it is possible to generate “bad primes” through chance or through repeated generation and testing. A significant problem with public key encryption is that some of the public keys might be weaker than others and therefore, if used, will give an attacker a greater chance of breaking the encryption and discovering the secret. For example, a prime number p used in the RSA encryption algorithm would be considered weak for the purposes of RSA encryption or signature generation if either p−1 or p+1 does not have any large prime divisors. Similarly, an elliptic curve encryption or signature generation will be subject to an attack if the value of the private key d is very small as compared to the size of the underlying finite field. See ANSI Standard X9.31-1998 Digital Signatures Using Reversible Public Key Cryptography For the Financial Services Industry (rDSA) and ANSI Standard X9.62-1998 The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm for the details of these methods.

While the algorithm specified in this invention creates “strong” primes in the definitions of the ANSI Standard X9.31 (that is, p−1, p+1, q−1, and q+1 all have large prime factors and |p−q| is large), the present invention should alleviate a requirement that such be present since the probability of such occurrence at random is extremely low and by not allowing many repeated efforts to generate a pair of primes, imposing such restrictions becomes unnecessary.

OBJECTS OF THE INVENTION

It is an object of the present invention to provide an improved method, system and apparatus for the generation of cryptographic variables, including secret keys and secret prime numbers required in the generation of public and private keys used with a public key algorithm.

It is yet another object of the present invention to provide a method, system and apparatus for user-controlled generation of cryptographic variables, such as keys, that eliminates first party attacks wherein the user intentionally repeatedly invokes the generation procedure until a “bad” value, with some desired “bad” property, is produced.

It is yet another object of the present invention to enable user-controlled generation of prime numbers that eliminates first party attacks.

It is still another object of the present invention to allow a prime number generation procedure that does not require the primes to be strong.

SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION

These and other objects of the invention are accomplished by the invention described herein. The present invention involves a method, system and apparatus for utilizing a trusted third party, namely a Certification Authority (CA) in the generation of a seed. The Certification Authority is already involved in cryptography and is a critical part of the public key infrastructure. Involving the Certification Authority in the prevention of a first party attack does not introduce a new entity and therefore does not significantly increase overhead.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWING

FIG. 1 depicts a logical overview of the present invention.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE PREFERRED EMBODIMENT

The present invention will now be described in detail with respect to a preferred embodiment and the FIGURE. This embodiment is not meant to limit or restrict the invention in any way but is meant as an example of how the invention may be implemented.

In the preferred embodiment a user provides information to a Certificate Authority who generates a signed value and provides the signed value back to the user. The Certificate Authority also maintains a count of repeated attempts to acquire signed values such that if a first party attack were to occur, the Certificate Authority would recognize the numerous repeated requests from the same user. The generation of the seed, Xseed, of the present invention is as follows:

Inputs:

L=the length, in bits, of a seed to be generated

p₀=a publicly known prime number of length L bits

g=a publicly known generator used to secure communications between the user and the Certification Authority

H=a hash function

PKca, SKca—the Certification Authority's public and private (secret) key pair used for signing

x=a secret value (of length L−1 bits) generated by the user

z=a secret value (of length L−1 bits) generated by the CA.

Output:

Xseed=a seed to be used to generate keys for public encryption.

Referring to FIG. 1, first the user 150 randomly generates an integer x 101 of length L−1 (where L=the length of the seed to be generated). The user then computes y 103 where y=g^(x)(mod p₀) and sends y 105 to the Certification Authority 151. The Certification Authority 151 then receives y from the user 150 and randomly generates an integer z 107 of size L−1 bits and computes w 109 where w=H(y*g^(z)(mod p₀)) and signs w 111 with its private (or secret) key SKca. This signed value is called Sign. The Certification Authority next increments a counter 113 to track the number of times the user has asked for assistance in establishing seeds. This can be done per user or for the entire CA. If the count is larger than some reasonable threshold for a particular user (or for the entire CA if the counters are not kept per user) then the CA might suspect that a user is attempting a first party attack and the CA will send a warning to a system administrator.

At step 115, the Certification Authority sends z and the signed w (Sigw) to the user for use in generating primes. The user computes Xseed 117 to be x+z. The user then computes w 119 where w=H(g^(Xseed)(mod p₀)) and verifies the signature on w 121 (Sigw) using the public verification key of the Certification Authority (PKca). This ensures the user that an audit can be passed.

The user now keeps Sigw and Xseed. The user next proceeds to generate the public keys 123 using Xseed as a seed. If more than one seed is needed then a similar procedure can be used to generate each required seed.

There are many signing algorithms which are well known in the art. Using the present invention and the RSA signature generation, the user can successfully pass an audit by proving that the proper procedure was followed by computing PKca(Sigw). This can be done by using the stored value Xseed and the public values of g and p₀ to first compute w=H(g^(Xseed)(mod p₀)), then validating w using the stored value Sigw and the public verification key of the Certification Authority, PKca. If the signature is valid, then one knows that the user followed the rules and passes the audit.

A second embodiment of the present invention does not require the user to save Sigw, but instead, a hash of Sigw is stored in the user's public key certification. The procedure is the same as in the previous embodiment except that, after the user has generated his public key and requests a public key certification from the CA, the CA will compute a hash on Sigw and store H(Sigw) in the certificate. The copy of Sigw used for this purpose could be a copy which is saved by the Certification Authority in anticipation that the user will request a certificate or it could be supplied by the user as part of the certificate request process. When the user receives a certificate, he validates the certificate using the public verification key of the Certification Authority, PKca and also verifies that the copy of H(Sigw) in the certificate is equal to a like copy of H(Sigw) that the user computes from the stored value of Sigw which the user has saved. If this validation step succeeds then the user accepts the certificate and may now discard the saved copy of Sigw. In either case, if the validation step fails, then the user does not accept the certificate.

The audit procedure for the second embodiment is slightly more complex. First the user reveals the Xseed to the auditor. The auditor computes w=H(g^(Xseed)(mod p₀)). The auditor then asks the Certification Authority to sign the computed w with his private signature key (SKca) and the Certification Authority provides Sigw to the auditor. The auditor computes H(Sigw) by hashing Sigw with a hash function H (for example, using SHA-1). The auditor then validates the user's certificate using the public verification key of the Certification Authority PKca, and then validates that the copy of H(Sigw) stored in the user's certificate is equal to the value H(Sigw) computed above. It will be obvious to one skilled in the art that the Auditor and the Certification Authority may be the same party. 

What is claimed is:
 1. A system for generating keys for use in public key cryptography, said system comprising: a user and a Certification Authority, said Certification Authority having a public key and a private key wherein said user sends first information computed using a first random number to said Certification Authority, said Certification Authority uses said first information in combination with a second random number computed by said Certification Authority to generate a value that is signed with said Certification Authority's private key thereby generating second information which is returned to said user along with said second random number, said user verifies said second information using said Certification Authority's public key along with said first random number and said second random number and, if said second information is verified, utilizes said first random number and said second random number to compute a seed for generating said keys.
 2. A system for generating prime numbers for use in public key cryptography, said system comprising: a user and a Certification Authority, said Certification Authority having a public key, PKca, and a private key SKca; wherein, said user randomly generates an integer x having one less bit than a desired length (L) of a seed value; said user computes a value y using a publicly known generator used to secure communications between the user and said Certification Authority, wherein a publicly known prime number p₀ and the randomly generated integer x are used as input parameters of said generator when computing y; said user sends y to said Certification Authority; said Certification Authority randomly generates an L−1 bit integer, z; said Certification Authority computes a number w using the publicly known generator, wherein y, p₀, and z are used as input parameters of said generator when computing w; said Certification Authority signs w with said private key of the Certification Authority, SKca, yielding a value called Sigw; said Certification Authority sends z and Sigw to said user; said user computes a number Xseed as (x+z); said user independently computes w using the publicly known generator, wherein p₀ and the computed number Xseed are used as input parameters of said generator when independently computing w; said user verifies said signature on Sigw using said Certification Authority's public key, PKca, against the independently computed w; and if a result of said verification is successful, said computed number Xseed is used by said user to generate said seed value.
 3. A system for generating prime numbers for use in public key cryptography, said system comprising: a user and a Certification Authority, said Certification Authority having a public key, PKca, and a private key SKca; wherein, said user randomly generates an integer x having one less bit than a desired length of a seed value; said user computes a value y, where y=g^(x)(mod p₀) and wherein: g is a publicly known generator used to secure communications between the user and said Certification Authority; p₀ is a publicly known prime number of length L, L being a number of bits in said seed value; and p₀ and the randomly generated integer x are used as input parameters of said generator when computing y; said user sends y to said Certification Authority; said Certification Authority randomly generates an L−1 bit integer, z, and computes w=H(y*g^(z)(mod p₀)) where H is a hash function; said Certification Authority signs w with said private key of the Certification Authority, SKca, yielding a resulting value called Sigw; said Certification Authority sends z and Sigw to said user; said user computes a number Xseed as (x+z); said user independently computes w=H(g^(Xseed)(mod p₀)); said user verifies said signature on Sigw using said Certification Authority's public key, PKca, against the independently computed w; and if a result of said verification is successful, said computed number Xseed is used by said user to generate said seed value.
 4. The system as claimed in claim 2 or 3, further comprising: increasing, by said Certification Authority, a count of a number of requests received after computing Sigw; and monitoring, by said Certification Authority, said increased count in order to detect attempts to generate a weak value.
 5. The system as claimed in claim 4, wherein said count is kept per user.
 6. In a computer communications system having a user and a Certification Authority, said Certification Authority having a public key and a private key, a method for generating keys for use in public key cryptography, said method comprising the steps of: sending, by said user, a first information computed using a first random number to said Certification Authority; using, by said Certification Authority, said first information in combination with a second random number computed by said Certification Authority to generate a value that is signed with said Certification Authority's private key, thereby generating second information; returning said second information to said user along with said second random number; verifying, by said user, said second information using said Certification Authority's public key along with said first random number and said second random number; and if said second information is verified, utilizing said first random number and said second random number to compute a seed for generating said keys.
 7. In a computer communications system having a user and a Certification Authority, said Certification having a public key (PKca) and a private key (SKca), a method for generating prime numbers for use in public key cryptography, said method comprising the steps of: randomly generating, by said user, an integer x having one less bit than a desired length of a seed value; computing, by said user, a value y, using a publicly known generator used to secure communications between the user and said Certification Authority, wherein a publicly known prime number p₀ and the randomly generated integer x are used as input parameters of said generator when computing y; sending y to said Certification Authority; randomly generating, by said Certification Authority, an L−1 bit integer, z; computing, by said Certification Authority, a number w using the publicly known generator, wherein y, p₀, and z are used as input parameters of said generator when computing w; signing, by said Certification Authority, w with said private key of said Certification Authority, SKca, yielding a value called Sigw; sending z and Sigw to said user; computing, by said user, a number Xseed as (x+z); independently computing w by said user using the publicly known generator, wherein p₀ and Xseed are used as input parameters of said generator when independently computing w verifying, by said user, said signature on Sigw using said Certification Authority's public key, PKca, against the independently computed w; and if a result of said verification is successful, using said computed number Xseed by said user to generate said seed value.
 8. In a computer communications system having a user and a Certification Authority, said Certification Authority having a public key (PKca) and a private key (SKca), a method for generating prime numbers for use in public key cryptography, said method comprising the steps of: randomly generating, by said user, an integer x having one less bit than a desired length of a seed value; computing, by said user, a value y, where y=g^(x)(mod p₀) and wherein: g is a publicly known generator used to secure communications between the user and said Certification Authority; p₀ is a publicly known prime number of length L, where L is a number of bits in said seed value; and p₀ and the randomly generated integer x are used as input parameters of said generator when computing y; sending y to said Certification Authority; randomly generating, by said Certification Authority, an L−1 bit integer, z, and computing w=H(y*g^(z)(mod p₀)) where H is a hash function; signing, by said Certification Authority, w with said private key of said Certification Authority, SKca, yielding a value called Sigw; sending z and Sigw to said user; computing, by said user, a number Xseed as (x+z); independently computing w=H(g^(Xseed)(mod p₀)) by said user; verifying, by said user, said signature on Sigw using said Certification Authority's public key, PKca, against the independently computed w; and if a result of said verification is successful, using said computed number Xseed by said user to generate said seed value.
 9. The method as claimed in claim 7 or 8, further comprising the steps of: increasing a count of a number of requests received by said Certification Authority; and monitoring, by said Certification Authority, said increased count in order to detect attempts to generate a weak value.
 10. The method as claimed in claim 9, wherein said count is kept per user. 